



INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
ON THE NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL 
AND EASTERN EUROPE
Introduction
The process of transition is fraught with numerous challenges and requires sub-
stantial political will as well as cautiousness in taking steps towards the design of 
the created or re-emerged institutions. Recovery of the rule of law is, probably, 
the biggest challenge of that process. Luckily, at the moment of collapse of the 
Eastern Block, there already was an institution able to set the standards for the 
insurance of civil liberties, independence of judiciary, pluralism, and tolerance – 
the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR or the Court). Though, 
in early 90s it was not yet a full-time institution, still, it was able to provide guid-
ance in setting the basic human rights standards, and after becoming a permanent 
Court in 1998 – to adhering to them. Hence, the aim of this paper is to assess the 
impact of this supra-national institution on the evolution of national legal systems 
in the states of Central and Eastern Europe.
Due to the transition process and underdeveloped body of laws dealing 
with human rights adherence, the countries of this region pose a particular inter-
est for research in this context since the decisions laid down by the European 












European States with well-developed institutional capacities for human rights 
implementation. Therefore, this paper will, fi rstly, provide an overview of the 
ECtHR’s competence and its transformation induced by accession of Central-
Eastern European countries. Secondly, it will look at the main mechanisms of 
the ECtHR decision-making and implementation and their applicability in the 
context of the region under analysis. Finally, it will allow for an empirical over-
view concerning the progress of addressing the systemic violations of the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights by the legal systems of Central and Eastern 
European countries. For this purpose, the paper will indicate the articles that 
are violated and brought before the Court the most frequently in each state of 
the region, and thus, highlight the systemic failures to meet the Convention’s 
requirements. Then, it will check whether the frequency of violation of those 
articles decreased over the last decade in order to assess whether those systemic 
problems were addressed properly. Finally, it will provide the closure rate of 
the cases for each of the states in order to evaluate compliance with the Court’s 
decisions. Therefore, this paper will not only indicate the main problems of the 
human rights adherence in the countries of the Central-Eastern Europe, but also 
contemplate on the Court’s capability to bring about the structural changes in 
the states under its jurisdiction.
The evolution of the ECtHR competence
As it often happens, the original idea behind the creation of the institution does 
not necessarily develop in the expected way. This is also the case for the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. The initial rationale for creating the Court was 
induced by the reality of the post-war Europe and the need for establishing mini-
mal standards for the protection of human rights as well as the institutions able 
to enforce them.1 Henceforth, after the war, the newly established Council of 
Europe produced the document that would guarantee the insurance of the civil 
and political liberties together with the rule of law on the European continent, 
and thus, prevent the repetition of the war atrocities – the European Convention 
on Human Rights.2 However, it is important to mention that, unlike the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention did not have to reconcile numerous 
ideologies since its signatories already had a uniform vision about its aspirations 
and character. In this sense, it was more akin to historical national documents 
1 A. Stone Sweet, H. Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Orders, “Fac-
ulty Scholarship Series” 2008, Paper 89, pp. 11–36; S. Domaradzki, The Council of Europe’s Hu-
man Rights System after Sixty Years – Political Evolution and Continuance, “Krakowskie Studia 
Międzynarodowe” 2009, No. 3, pp. 75–94.
2 Foster S., Human Rights and Civil Liberties, 2nd edition, Person Education, London 
2008, p. 40.
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designed for human rights protection such as the United States Bill of Rights, 
German Basic Law, or French Declaration of rights of Man and the Citizen.3 
Moreover, since the human rights implementation in the legal system of the ini-
tial signatories4 with a few exceptions was on already high level, the organisation 
reminded more of a “gentlemen’s club” than the supervisory institution.
In order to create the machinery for Convention’s implementation, the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights was fi nally established in 1959 under the article 
19.5 However, the original character of the Court was quite loose with principles 
of subsidiarity and margin of appreciation conceived to constrain the institution 
against intervention into the national jurisdictions of its members.6
However, after the collapse of the Eastern Block and admission of the 
new members with underdeveloped legal systems into the Council of Europe, 
the Court had to adjust its mechanisms and competence in order to stay effi  cient. 
In addition, many of the new signatories of the Convention did not share the same 
vision concerning the importance of human rights. Nonetheless, by signing 
the document, they stated their commitment to development and strengthening 
of the domestic institutions and principles of liberal democracy. Thus, the role 
of the Council of Europe shifted from being a “gentlemen’s club” to becom-
ing a “tutor, observer, and coordinator” for the new members.7 Subsequently, the 
Court required more pro-active and effi  cient mechanisms for “domestication” of 
the Convention.
One of the fi rst steps that was implemented to increase the capacity of 
the Court was elimination of the Commission of Human Rights and centralisa-
tion of the Court by the Protocol 11, which was signed in 1998.8 As a result, 
all the processes of case admittance and review go directly through the ECtHR 
structures. Then, the Court’s judgements became binding in their character and 
the acceptance of individual complaints was changed to mandatory. Moreover, 
and probably the most importantly, the initial list of rights expanded signifi cantly 
and added such rights as the right to property, education, abolition of death 
3 D. Vitkauskas, G. Dikov, Protecting the Right to a Fair Trial under the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. A Handbook for Legal Practitioners, 2nd edition, Council of Europe, 
Strasbourg 2017, pp. 13–15.
4 The initial signatories of the Convention in 1950 were Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, and the United King-
dom. 
5 European Convention on Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights, Council 
of Europe, Strasbourg, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [accessed: 
25.09.2018].
6 A. Stone Sweet, H. Keller, op. cit., pp. 13–14.
7 S. Domaradzki, op. cit., p. 80.
8 Council of Europe, Protocol No. 11 to The Convention for the Protection of Human 




penalty9, and prohibition of discrimination.10 Thus, as Stone Sweet and Kel-
ler notices, the Court “[…] evolved into intricate legal system”11 and acquired 
substantial infl uence over the domestic jurisdiction. As a result, even the initial 
signatories, which had a developed framework for the human rights protection 
underestimated the future infl uence on their national legal systems.12 Naturally, 
the states undergoing the reconstruction of their justice system were much more 
susceptive to its impact. 
Mechanisms and applicability of the Court’s decisions
As it was mentioned previously, two principles that are deemed central to the 
Court’s functioning are subsidiarity and margin of appreciation. As for the for-
mer, subsidiarity was offi  cially reinforced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and 
implies taking action locally fi rst before delegating the issue to the higher su-
pra-national authorities.13 Thus, it allows for intervention of the Court into the 
national jurisdiction only when the domestic legal system is not able to ensure 
implementation of human rights, as stated in the article 35 of the Convention.14 
At the same time, it also means that the Court is entitled with fi nal jurisdiction in 
interpreting the Convention. Thus, Keller notes that it gives it “structural judicial 
supremacy” over the national courts.
The second crucial principle of the Court – margin of appreciation – is 
also seen as a mechanism to restrict the Court’s power. This principle allows to 
adjust the Court’s rulings to domestic reality, and thus, leaves the fi nal say in 
implementation of the judgements to the national authorities. After all, as it was 
rightfully noted by Lord Hoff mann, “[…] human rights are universal at the level 
of abstraction […] [but] national at level of application”.15 However, some schol-
9 Protocol No. 6, which includes prohibition of death penalty was not ratifi ed by Russian 
Federation; Council of Europe, Chart of signatures and ratifi cations of Treaty 114, https://www.coe.
int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/114/signatures?p_auth=uvjrHSQX [accessed: 
28.04.2019].
10 Protocol No. 12 dealing with prohibition of discrimination was not signed by many 
members, including Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Lithuania, Monaco, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom; Council of Europe, Chart of signatures and ratifi cations of Treaty 177, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/177/signatures [accessed: 
29.04.2019].
11 A. Stone Sweet, H. Keller, op. cit., p.11.
12 H. Keller, A. Stone Sweet, Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems, 
“Faculty Scholarship Series”, Paper 88, pp. 677–712.
13 D. Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, “Duke Journal 
of Comparative & International Law” 2003, Vol. 13, pp. 95–153.
14 European Convention on Human Rights, op. cit.
15 L. Hoff mann, The Universality of Human Rights, Judicial Studies Board Annual Lec-
ture, 19.03.2009, p. 14, http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/biij/BIIJ2013/
hoff mann.pdf [accessed: 22.04.2019].
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ars also remark that the members of the Council do not have enough discretion 
and the Court should be more fl exible in application of human rights standards to 
the national realities.16 
Moreover, after the Protocol No. 11 allowed for individual applications 
to the Court17, the number of cases brought before the Court skyrocketed, which 
required not only to substantially decrease the amount of time devoted to case 
proceedings but also to issue so-called “pilot judgements” to address similar 
cases, especially for states of Central-Eastern Europe, where systemic viola-
tions produced numerous and almost identical cases.18 For example, at the mo-
ment of writing of this paper, the number of pending cases amounted to 2268, 
only 136 of which received the status of closed during the last year, according 
to HUDOC database.19 Naturally, it does not facilitate the problem with the lack 
of case deliberation.
To prevent the future violations, the Court has two types of measures to 
punish the state: just satisfaction or proposing an action plan to address the sys-
temic violation.20 Most often, in order to allow for certain discretion in national 
policies and due to non-compliance concerns, the Court rules for monetary rem-
edies as a compensation for violation of certain rights.21 Though this remedy is 
the most eff ective, it might be seen as morally dubious to assign a price for viola-
tion of human rights. Moreover, simple cost-benefi t analysis may stimulate the 
country to reach the conclusion that paying just satisfaction is less expensive that 
redesigning the institutional system.22
Thus, the empirical analysis is required in order to assess whether states 
of the region under the analysis were successful in internalising the courts pro-
visions and whether the increase in coercive possibilities of the courts might 
be justifi ed.
16 de la Rasilla del Moral I., The Increasingly Marginal Appreciation of the Margin of Ap-
preciation Doctrine, “German Law Journal” 2006, Vol. 7, Issue 6, pp. 611–623; E. Brems, The Mar-
gin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, “Zeitschrift 
Für Ausländisches Öff entliches Recht Und Völkerrecht” 1996, Bd. 56, pp. 240–314; L. Hoff mann, 
op. cit..
17 Council of Europe, Protocol No. 11 to The Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms…, op. cit.
18 A. Stone Sweet, H. Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Orders, 
“Faculty Scholarship Series” 2008, Paper 89, pp. 11–36.
19 HUDOC (Human Rights Documentation) is the case law database of the ECHR, see: 
HUDOC – European Court of Human Rights, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int [accessed: 28.04.2019].
20 S. Domaradzki, op. cit., p. 83.
21 V. Fikfak, Changing State Behaviour: Damages before the European Court of Human 
Rights, “The European Journal of International Law” 2018, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 1103. DOI:10.1093/
ejil/chy064.
22 S. Domaradzki, op. cit., p. 84.
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Statistical overview of the Court’s impact on the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe
The fi nal part of this paper will assess the frequency of violation of certain arti-
cles by the Central and Eastern European states. The rationale behind it is that 
frequent appeals invoking the same article of the Convention will indicate sys-
temic failure to address the corresponding right. After indicating such “systemic 
weaknesses”, the changes in the domestic legal systems implemented to prevent 
further violation (if any) will be analysed. The countries under the analysis in-
clude the states of the Eastern and Central Europe, which joined the EU after the 
Eastern enlargement in 2004: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slo-
venia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. All of those states signed the Convention in 
the period between 1991 and 1995.23 The data for the analysis was collected from 
the HUDOC database, administered by the ECtHR.
The variables based on which the states’ compliance with the ECtHR 
judgements and integration with the domestic legal systems was assessed were 
the following:
1. The frequency of fi ling the cases by ECHR article. For each country un-
der the analysis, fi ve most frequently invoked articles were selected are 
compared with the other states of the region. Here, only the cases with the 
judgement issued by the Court were included, omitting pending or rejected 
cases. Moreover, only articles and protocols directly address specifi c hu-
man rights violations were included, among them are articles 1–18 and 
Protocols No. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13.
2. The frequency change of invoking the articles selected in the previous step 
in time during the past ten years. It allowed to assess whether the systemic 
failure was addressed and corrected.
3. The data regarding the remedies for violations of ECHR provisions. Here, 
one of the most vivid indicators was the payment of just satisfaction and 
number of closed cases in the last year.
The results of the fi rst step of the analysis are the following. Firstly, Table 1 
provides the data regarding the most frequently invoked articles for each state of 
the region:
23 The states signed the European Convention on Human Rights in the following years: 
Hungary – 1990, Poland – 1991, Czech Republic – 1991, Slovakia – 1991, Slovenia – 1993, Lithu-
ania – 1993, Estonia – 1993, Latvia – 1995; Council of Europe, Chart of signatures and ratifi -
cations of Treaty 005, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/
signatures?p_auth=qoeJhWyQ [accessed: 28.04.2019].
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Table 1. The most frequently invoked ECHR articles by country
State FREQ 1 FREQ 2 FREQ 3 FREQ 4 FREQ 5
Poland Art. 6 (595) Art. 5 (295) Art. 8 (136) Prot. 1.1 (77) Art. 10 (50)
Hungary Art. 6 (207) Art. 8 (35) Art. 5 (33) Prot. 1.1 (30) Art. 3 (27)
Czech Republic Art. 6 (152) Art. 8 (36) Prot. 1.1 (28) Art. 13 (24) Art. 5 (20)
Slovakia Art. 6 (227) Art. 13 (56) Art. 5 (38) Prot. 1.1 (29) Art. 8 (28)
Slovenia Art. 6 (266) Art. 13 (224) Art. 8 (20) Prot. 1.1 (12) Art. 14 (8)
Latvia Art. 6 (45) Art. 3 (39) Art. 5 (35) Art. 8 (31) Art. 13 (10)
Lithuania Art. 6 (67) Prot. 1.1 (34) Art. 8 (33) Art. 3 (22) Art. 5 (20)
Estonia Art. 6 (26) Art. 3 (12) Art. 5 (9) Art. 8 (8) Art. 10 (4)
Source: HUDOC database.
From the Table 1, it is evident that among all the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, article 6 is invoked the most frequently. This article addresses the 
right to fair trial24, which indicates a systemic failure of the states to ensure this 
right together with the underdevelopment of the legal systems. Then, violation 
of article 8 – right to respect for private and family life – is among the fi ve most 
frequently invoked articles for all the states of the region. Violation of this article 
has its own aspects for each of the states. In case of Poland, for example, it is fore-
most indicative of the lack of access to abortion. Then, with the only exception 
of Estonia and Latvia, article 1 of the protocol No. 1 appears among the fi ve most 
frequently violated ECHR articles for all the states under analysis. This article 
concerns right to property and in the context of the Central and Eastern European 
states, it might be attributed to the process of transition from the communist past. 
Among the other frequently invoked articles for the states under analysis are 
article 5 – right to liberty and security, article 10 – freedom of expression, article 
13 – right to an eff ective remedy, and article 14 – prohibition of discrimination 
(for Slovenia only). Noticeably, article 3 – prohibition of torture – appears among 
the fi ve most frequent articles for Baltic states and Hungary, which is related to 
poor prison conditions.25
Next, it is necessary to trace the main tendencies in frequency changes 
for each of the most violated ECHR provisions over the past decade in order 
to assess the degree of “domestication” of the Convention. Firstly, for Poland, 
the most frequently violated articles were article 6, 5, 8, 10, and article 1 of the 
24 European Convention on Human Rights, op. cit.
25 Such violations were reported by Amnesty International in 2008, Latvia and Lithu-
ania: human rights on the march?, Amnesty International, 23.04.2008, https://web.archive.org/
web/20090611035257/http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR53/001/2008/en [accessed: 
24.03.2019], and the US Bureau of Diplomacy, Human Rights, and Labour in 2008 and 2017: 2008 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, United States Department of State, https://www.state.
gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119087.htm; 2017 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, United 
States Department of State, 20.04.2018, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277431.
pdf [accessed: 28.04.2019].
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Protocol 1. The frequency of violation of those articles from 2008 to 2018 looks 
as the following.
















2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Art. 5 Art. 8 P 1.1. Art. 10
Source: HUDOC database.
Thus, the most noticeable trend for Poland is an overall dropdown in num-
ber of cases over the past decade, which might indicate internalisation of the 
ECHR provisions for the country’s legal system.
For Hungary, the chart 2 demonstrates similar tendencies.

















2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Art. 5 Art. 10 Art. 3 P 1.1
Source: HUDOC…, op. cit. 
Overall, the number of cases has also dropped over the last decade. Howev-
er, it is also evident that, with the exception of violation of article 6, the frequency 
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of invoking the articles was rather low for the past decade, indicating “domestica-
tion” of those provisions by the Hungarian legal system even before that time.
Next, the situation for the Czech Republic looks as the following:














2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Art. 6 Art. 8 P 1.1 Art. 13 Art. 5
Source: HUDOC…, op. cit. 
In general, the frequency of the Convention violation in the country was 
lower than in Poland and Hungary and, with the exception of article 6 in 2011, did 
not exceed ten cases in the last decade, which also shows suffi  cient integration of 
the provisions into the domestic legal system.
As for Slovakia, the general tendency looks similar: the frequency of the 
violation of articles 6, 13, 5, 8, and article 1 of the Protocol 1 was relatively low 
during the past decade:
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Art. 6 Art. 13 Art. 5 P 1.1 Art. 8
Source: HUDOC…, op. cit. 
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Then, the trends concerning Slovenia are somewhat diff erent:















2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Art. 6 Art. 13 Art. 8 P 1.1 Art. 14
Source: HUDOC…, op. cit. 
The chart appears less dropping down that for the previous states. There is 
a small increase in violation of articles 6 and 8 in the period between 2011 and 
2014. Though it should be kept in mind that the highest value does not exceed 
fi fteen cases per year.
As for the Baltic states, the charts look in the following way:













2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Art. 6 Art. 3 Art. 5 Art. 8 Art. 13
Source: HUDOC…, op. cit. 
For Latvia, the most violated articles were rarely invoked over the past 
decade, peaking at eleven cases in 2012 for article 3. Though the general ten-
dency does not seem to be decreasing during the past decade, one should have in 
mind that the numbers represented on the chart are quite low.
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Next, the chart for Lithuania has the following outlook:
















2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Art. 6 P 1.1 Art. 8 Art. 3 Art. 5
Source: HUDOC…, op. cit. 
Again, the downward trend is not visible but overall numbers of violations 
are rather low and are kept below eight cases per year. However, there is a slow 
increase in violation of article 8.
Finally, the similar chart for Estonia shows the following trends:











2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Art. 6 Art. 3 Art. 5 Art. 8 Art. 10
Source: HUDOC…, op. cit. 
Comparing to other countries of the region, Estonia has the lowest number 
of violations of the articles, where systemic violations were suspected to be. It 
might indicate that the Estonian legal system has successfully internalised the 
Convention norms before the last decade.
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Thus, for all the states under analysis the systemic failures indicated by the 
most frequently invoked articles of the Convention indicate either a downward 
trend (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) or show rather low numbers, 
which do not exceed fi fteen cases per year (Slovenia and Baltic states). It might 
be indicative of internalisation of the Convention norms by the states of Central 
and Eastern Europe.
Finally, the percentage of the closed cases might also help to assess state’s 
compliance with the Court’s decisions. For the selected states, the numbers are 
the following:
Table 2. Number of cases per country. HUDOC database
State Registered cases Closed cases Closure rate
Poland 1680 1587 94%
Hungary 949 657 69%
Czech Republic 224 219 98%
Slovakia 505 463 92%
Slovenia 342 330 96%
Latvia 116 109 94%
Lithuania 150 107 71%
Estonia 51 49 96%
Source: HUDOC database.
The Table 2 indicates two outliers, Hungary and Lithuania, which show 
somewhat lesser closure rate of the cases. As for the other states of the region, 
they show almost exemplary high rates over 90%, which demonstrates their com-
pliance with the court’s judgements.
Conclusion
To conclude, the paper provided an overview of transformations of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights over the years in order to meet the challenges of 
the time: numerous new members with underdeveloped legal systems and with 
almost no history of continuous institutions able to protect political rights of its 
citizens. 
In order to assess, whether the Court was successful in internalising the 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights in domestic legisla-
ture of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, the statistical analysis was pro-
vided. It listed the articles which were violated the most in the countries under 
the analysis, and thus, indicated the systemic failures to meet the requirements of 
the Convention. Among those were right to fair trial, right to liberty and security, 
prohibition of torture, right to property, right to respect for private and family 
life, freedom of expression, and right to an eff ective remedy. For each country, 
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the frequency of the most violated rights was traced through the last decade in 
order to determine whether those systemic failures were addressed. It was con-
cluded that in the period from 2008 to 2018, the most frequently violated provi-
sions either showed a decreasing tendency or were not numerous, which indicates 
“domestication” of the Convention’s norms. Finally, the closure rate of the cases 
demonstrated a very high proportion of closed to registered cases (higher than 
90% for almost all states of the region), which shows high degree of compliance 
with the Court’s decisions.
Thus, the empirical analysis demonstrated that the changes introduced to 
the ECtHR, though are often criticised for being coercive, proved to be eff ective 
in transforming the legal systems of the Central and Eastern European states and 
internalising the Convention’s provisions.
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Wpływ Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka 
na krajowe systemy prawne w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej
Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka przeszedł znaczną transformację w zakresie swoich kompe-
tencji od momentu powstania do chwili obecnej. Z jednej strony wywołało to krytykę i ostrożność 
starych członków. Z drugiej strony, transformacja wynikała z konieczności dostosowania Trybuna-
łu do wymagań nowych członków o słabo rozwiniętych mechanizmach ochrony praw człowieka. 
Artykuł oceni główne zmiany w mechanizmie funkcjonowania Trybunału i dostarczy empiryczną 
analizę jego postępów w internalizacji norm praw człowieka w systemach prawnych państw Euro-
py Środkowo-Wschodniej. W tym celu artykuł wskaże poważne systemowe niedostosowanie się 
wybranych państw do wymogów Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka, systemowe zmiany 
w ciągu ostatniej dekady oraz zgodność działań tych państw z wyrokami Trybunału. Z artykułu wy-
nika, że pomimo krytyki ETPC udowodnił swoją skuteczność we wskazywaniu i rozwiązywaniu 
niepowodzeń systemowych w państwach prawa Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej.
Słowa kluczowe: prawa człowieka, Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, Europa Środkowo-
-Wschodnia, zmiany instytucjonalne, Polska, Węgry, Czechy, Słowacja, Słowenia, Łotwa, Litwa, 
Estonia
145INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS...
Infl uence of the European Court of Human Rights 
on the National Legal Systems in Central and Eastern Europe
The European Court of Human Rights has undergone substantial transformation in its competence 
from the times of its creation to nowadays. From one side, it induced criticism and wariness from its 
members. From the other side, however, such measures were encouraged by the necessity to adjust 
the Court to numerous new members with underdeveloped human rights protection mechanisms. 
Thus, this paper will assess the major changes in the machinery of the court and provide empirical 
analysis of the Court’s progress in internalisation of the human rights norms in the legal systems of 
the states of Central and Eastern Europe. For that purpose, it will indicate major systemic failures 
to meet the requirements of the European Convention of Human Rights, their changes over the past 
decade, and states’ compliance with the Court’s judgements. It concludes that despite the criticism, 
ECtHR has proved its effi  ciency in indicating and dealing with the systemic failures in the legal 
systems of the states under analysis.
Key words: Human rights, European Court of Human Rights, Central and Eastern Europe, insti-
tutional change, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia

